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The usual Condorcet Criterion says that if an alternative is ranked ahead of all other
alternatives by an absolute majority of voters, it should be declared the winner. The
following partial extension of this criterion to other ranks is proposed: If an alternative
is consistently ranked ahead of another alternative by an absolute majority of voters, it
should be ahead in the final ranking. The term "consistently" refers to the absence of
cycles in the majority relation involving these two alternatives. If there are cycles, this
criterion gives partial orders that can be completed with the Kemeny rule. An algorithm
to construct Kemeny orders is presented. It is based on a result saying that a complete
Kemeny order over all alternatives can be obtained by splicing together Kemeny orders
on the subsets of an admissible partition of the alternatives underlying the Extended
Condorcet Criterion.
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Résumé
Le critère usuel de Condorcet exige que, si une alternative est classée avant toutes les
autres par une majorité de votants, elle devrait être déclarée vainqueur. Une extension
partielle de ce critère aux autres rangs est proposée: Si une alternative est classée avant
une autre de manière cohérente par une majorité de votants, elle devrait l’être dans le
classement final. La cohérence réfère à l’absence de cycle dans la relation majoritaire
impliquant ces deux alternatives. En cas de cycles, ce critère donne des ordres partiels,
qui peuvent être complétés avec la règle de Kemeny. Un algorithme pour la construction
des ordres de Kemeny est présenté. Il s’appuie sur un résultat affirmant qu’un ordre de
Kemeny peut être obtenu en juxtaposant des ordres de Kemeny sur les sous-ensembles
d’une partition des alternatives sous-jacente au critère de Condorcet généralisé.1. Introduction
The usual Condorcet Criterion found in the literature says that if an alternative or a candidate is
ranked ahead of all other alternatives by an absolute majority of voters, it should be declared the winner.
Such an alternative may fail to exist because of a cycle in the majority relation. When it exists, it is called
the Condorcet winner.
Condorcet was preoccupied not only with the winner but also with the whole ranking of all
alternatives. This may pose a problem, again because of the possibility of a cycle in the majority relation.
Yet, a partial extension of the Condorcet Criterion to other ranks can be done as follows: If an alternative
is consistently ranked ahead of another alternative by an absolute majority of voters, it should be ahead
in the final ranking. The term "consistently" refers to the absence of cycles involving these two alter-
natives.
A first objective of this paper is to propose a formalization of this idea, called the Extended
Condorcet Criterion (XCC). In essence, it says that if the set of alternatives can be partitioned in such a
way that all members of a subset of this partition defeat all alternatives belonging to subsets with a higher
index, then the former should obtain a better rank than the latter. A partition satisfying the above property
is said admissible for (XCC). If there is a cycle in the weak majority relation and, in particular, if there
is a subset of alternatives that all tie, then this cycle or subset should belong to a same subset of any
admissible partition.
This work was motivated by the comparison of aggregation procedures in figure skating. Ties
could not be neglected despite the complication that they usually bring. Indeed, two skaters may tie even
if the number of judges is odd because a judge may give the same rank to more than one skater. Ties may
create cycles in the weak majority relation and increase the length of existing ones. Many ties and many
cycles of the weak majority relation have actually been found in the data of Olympic Games analyzed in
Truchon (1998).
In the presence of cycles, (XCC) gives a partial order of the alternatives. The question is then:
how to complete this order to obtain a complete ranking? To answer this question while remaining in the
spirit of (XCC), let us turn to another question addressed by Condorcet (1785): which final ranking is most
3likely to be the true ranking of the alternatives? Neglecting the possibility of ties, Condorcet showed that
if the pairwise ranking of the alternatives under the majority rule does not involve any cycle, then it yields
a complete order that has maximum likelihood of being the true order, under the assumption that every
voter chooses the best of two alternatives with a probability larger than one half and that this judgment
is independent between pairs and voters.
Condorcet gave indications on how to break cycles that might occur. However, his prescription
is not completely clear. Young (1988) shows that a correct application of Condorcet’s maximum likelihood
approach leads to an order that has the maximum pairwise support from the voters. Such an order is often
called a Kemeny order because it involves the minimum number of pairwise inversions with the individual
rankings. Kemeny (1959) proposes this number as a distance between an order and a profile of individual
rankings. Such a ranking is also a median ranking for those composing a profile. In this sense, it
represents a best compromise between the possibly conflicting views of the voters.
It is shown in this paper that a Kemeny order satisfies (XCC). This is a good justification for
(XCC) and its name. Conversely, the Kemeny-Young approach is a natural complement to (XCC). Indeed,
a complete Kemeny order over all alternatives can be obtained by splicing together Kemeny orders on the
subsets of an admissible partition for (XCC). This is a very useful result since the Kemeny-Young
approach may become prohibitive when the number of alternatives is large. Note that in the finest possible
admissible partition for (XCC), many of the subsets may be singletons, which eases the task considerably.
A second objective of this paper is to present an algorithm, based on the above result, to construct
complete Kemeny orders. The key to this algorithm is the construction of an admissible partition. Actually,
if some alternatives tie within a subset of such a partition, then this subset can possibly be further
partitioned, thus enhancing the performance of the algorithm.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the notation including the formal
description of (XCC). For the sake of completeness, Section 3 first presents the Kemeny-Young approach
with sufficient details. It then develops the results on which the algorithm is based. This algorithm is
presented in Section 4. In Section 5, it is explained how we can deal with the multiplicity of Kemeny
orders. A brief conclusion makes up Section 6.
42. Notation
Let X be the set of alternatives, with cardinality X = m, and N be the set of voters, with N =
n, an odd number. Each voter j is assumed to have a weak order or ranking r
j of the alternatives in X. The
element r
j
s of this vector is the rank of alternative s. A ranking with no tie for a rank is an order on X.A n
order can be represented alternatively as a sequence s1s2..., where s1 and s2 are respectively the alternatives
with ranks 1 and 2, etc.




n.Aranking rule is a mapping FR : Â
n ®Â . FR(R) is the final ranking resulting from
profile R. In the language of the theory of social choice, FR is also a social welfare function.




t} and the complete binary relation M on X by
sMt Ûn st ³n ts. We write M for the asymmetric component of M, i.e. the relation defined by
sMt Ûn st > nts and T for the symmetric component of M, i.e. the relation defined by sTt Ûn st = nts. They
are respectively the majority relation, the strict majority relation and the ex aequo relation on X.W ec a n
read sMt as s defeats t and sTt as s ties with t.
A cycle of M is a subset {x1, ..., xk} Ì X such that xiMxi+1, i=1, ..., k − 1, and xkMx1. One defines
similarly cycles of M and T. Equivalently, a cycle of T is a subset S Ì X such that sTt " s,t Î S. Cycles
of M and T are obviously cycles of M.
The usual Condorcet Criterion reads as follows:
Condorcet Criterion (CC)
" s Î X, " t Î X, t ¹ s : sMt Þ FRs(R)=1a n dFRt(R)>1
An s satisfying (CC) may not exist because of a cycle in the majority relation M. When there
exists an s Î X satisfying (CC), this s is called the Condorcet winner. Note that there may exist a
Condorcet winner even if there are cycles over some subsets of alternatives.
To extend (CC) to other ranks, let Ã0(X) be the class of partitions X ={ X1, ..., Xp}o fX,
satisfying:
5" Xa, Xb Î X with a < b, " s Î Xa, " t Î Xb : sMt
Notice that, if there is a cycle of M over some subset of alternatives, then these alternatives must belong
to a same subset Xa of any partition in Ã0(X). In particular, this must be the case for two alternatives s
and t such that sT t. In the finest partition of this class, the sets Xa are cycles of maximal length of M or
singletons. X1 is also called the top cycle of M or the Condorcet set, a solution concept introduced by Good
(1971) and Schwartz (1972) for the strict majority relation. X2 is the top cycle on X\X 1, etc.
Extended Condorcet Criterion (XCC)
For any partition X Î Ã0(X), the following must hold:
" Xa, Xb Î X with a < b, " s Î Xa, " t Î Xb : FRs(R)<FRt(R)
If M = M and if M contains no cycles, then all Xa of the finest partition of Ã0(X) are singletons
and a final ranking FR(R) satisfying (XCC) is a complete order. When M contains a cycle, (XCC) does
not say how to rank alternatives within an Xa of the finest partition in Ã0(X). In particular, it does not
imply that FRs =F R t if sTt. In other words, (XCC) yields only a partial order in these circumstances.
A complete final ranking, consistent with (XCC), can be obtained with the maximum likelihood or
Kemeny approach.
3. Kemeny orders
Assuming that the rankings r
j in some profile R are independent evaluations of the true ranking
of the alternatives, an interesting question is: which final ranking FR(R) is most likely to be the true
ranking of the alternatives. This is precisely the question addressed by Condorcet (1785). His objective
was to justify the majority principle. Condorcet’s approach is one of the first applications of statistical
hypothesis testing and maximum likelihood estimation. He assumes that every voter chooses the best of
two alternatives with a probability p satisfying 1/2 < p £ 1, and that this judgment is independent between
pairs and voters. If the binary relation M is an order on X, then it is the solution to his problem, i.e. the
most probable order on X.I fM contains a cycle, Condorcet’s prescription is to eliminate some of the
propositions (sMt is a proposition), starting with the one with the weakest majority and so on until the
cycle disappears. This works fine if m = 3 but may give ambiguous results or a partial order for m ³ 4.
6Young (1988) develops a correct application of Condorcet’s maximum likelihood approach. In the
case m = 3, it goes as follows. If the true order on the set {a, b, c}i sabc, then, neglecting a multiplicative
constant and the argument R in nst(R), the conditional probability of observing a profile of votes R is given
by:
pnab(1 p)nbapnac(1 p)ncapnbc(1 p)ncb pnab nac nbc(1 p)nba nca ncb
The probability of observing the same profile, conditional on the true order being acb, is given by:
pnac(1 p)ncapnab(1 p)nbapncb(1 p)nbc pnac nab ncb(1 p)nca nba nbc






An order r* on X is a solution of Condorcet’s problem or a maximum likelihood order if it is a solution
of maxr ÎÂK(r, R). The value of K(r, R) may be seen as the total number of pairwise supports for r in
profile R, i.e. the total number of voters who rank pairs of alternatives as in r. A maximum likelihood
order is thus one that has the maximum total support from the voters as expressed in R.
This problem may be given a different expression using a notion of distance for orders proposed
by Kemeny (1959). It is presented here in a slightly modified form to accommodate the fact that weak
orders may be found in profiles of rankings. Given an order r, a weak order r
j ÎÂ , and two alternatives















j)=ås Î Xåt Î Xdst(r, r
j)
The value of dst(r, r
j) indicates whether there is a disagreement in the relative ranking of s and t between
r and r
j. D(r, r
j) is the total number of such disagreements between r and r
j. The function D is a distance
on the set Â, with the restriction that its first argument must be an order. One can then define a "distance"
d between an order r and a profile R by: d(r, R)=å
n
j=1D(r, r
j). In plain words, d(r, R) is the total number
of disagreements between an order r and all the rankings in profile R.
7A Kemeny order for a profile R is an order r
K solving min r ÎÂd(r, R), i.e. an order that is closest
to the given profile according to the "distance" d or an order that has the minimum number of
disagreements with the profile. A Kemeny order is also a median order for the rankings in the profile. As
such, it represents the best compromise between the different opinions of the voters.
The following lemmas and corollaries give some of the properties of this order. The first one
asserts that a Kemeny order is a maximum likelihood order. From this lemma, we can reassert that a
maximum likelihood order is one that has the maximum number of agreements with the profile.














Lemma 2: Suppose r
K = (1, 2, ..., m) is a Kemeny order for a given profile R. Then ns, s+1(R) ³n s+1, s(R),
s = 1, ..., m − 1, or, equivalently, 1M 2M...M m.
Proof.Foranys = 1, ..., m − 1,considertheorderr = (1, 2, ..., s −1 ,s +1 ,s, s + 2, ..., m).Bytheproof
of Lemma 1, d(r
K,R )−d(r, R)=ns, s+1 − ns+1, s, which cannot be negative if r is a Kemeny order.
Corollary 3: Given a Kemeny order for a given profile R, if there exists a Condorcet winner under this
profile, it must be the alternative ranked first in the Kemeny order.
Proof. Let r
K = (1, 2, ..., m) be a Kemeny order. From Lemma 2, ns−1, s(R) ³n s, s−1(R), s = 2, ..., m. Thus
none of the alternatives s = 2, ..., m may be a Condorcet winner, leaving 1 as the Condorcet winner.
Corollary 4: A Kemeny order r
K satisfies (XCC).
Proof. Suppose r
K violates (XCC), i.e. there exists a partition X Î Ã0(X), Xa, Xb Î X with a < b, s Î Xa




s. By definition of Ã0(X), we must have sMt. Thus, by Lemma 2, there must
exist other alternatives, say a, ..., k, between t and s in the Kemeny order. Using Lemma 2 again, we must
have tMaM...MkMs. Since we also have sMt, there is a cycle over the set {t,a, ..., b,s}. Using the
8definition of Ã0(X) again, {t,a, ..., b,s} should belong to the same set of the partition X. We thus have
a contradiction since, at the outset, s and t belonged to different Xa and Xb.
The next result provides an easy way to find complete Kemeny orders. In essence, it says that the
latter can be constructed by the concatenation of Kemeny orders on each of the sets of a partition
X Î Ã0(X). Recall that an order can take the form x or r, where xi is the alternative whose rank is i while
rs is the rank of alternative s.
Theorem 5: Take any partition X ={ X1, ..., Xp} Î Ã0(X) and a vector x* =( x1, ..., xp) where xa is a
Kemeny order on Xa under profile R restricted to Xa, a = 1, ..., p. Then x* or equivalently the correspon-
ding r* is a Kemeny order on X.
Proof. Suppose that there exists an order r on X such that K(r, R)>K(r*, R). Then r cannot be different
from r* in respect only to alternatives who belong to the same Xa since this would violate the assumption
that xa is a Kemeny order on Xa. Thus there exist Xa, Xb Î X with a < b, s Î Xa and t Î Xb such that
rt £ rs instead of rs < rt as in r*. By Corollary 4, r cannot be a Kemeny order since it violates (XCC). If
there were orders r such that K(r, R)>K(r*, R), there would be a Kemeny order among them. Thus there
is no such order and r* is a Kemeny order.
If M ¹ M, we can go one step further in partitioning X. Given a partition X Î Ã0(X), if there exists
an Xa Î X and a subset S Ì Xa such that sMt " s Î S, " t Î Xa, then Xa can be further partitioned into
{S, Xa\S} to give another (finer) partition of X. Note that if S > 1, then sTt " s,t Î S. This refinement
can possibly be repeated on Xa\S and so on. Call this enlarged class of partitions Ã(X).
Similarly, given a partition X Î Ã(X), if there exists an Xa Î X and a subset S Ì Xa such that
tMs " s Î S, " t Î Xa, then Xa can be further partitioned into {Xa\S, S} to give another (finer) partition
of X and so on. Let these finer partitions also belong to Ã(X). The class Ã(X) will be actually larger
than Ã0(X) only if M ¹ M. The cycles of M and T still belong to a same subset of any partition of Ã(X).
However, some cycles of M may have been broken in the refining process that leads from Ã0(X)t oÃ(X).
The following theorem justifies the above enlargement of the class of partitions.
9Theorem 6: Given a partition X ={ X1, ..., Xp} Î Ã(X) and some Xa Î X, if there exists a subset S Ì Xa
such that sMt " s Î S, " t Î Xa, then there exists a Kemeny order on Xa in which the elements of S
occupy the first S ranks in any order we wish. Similarly, if there exists a subset S Ì Xa such that
tMs " s Î S, " t Î Xa, then there exists a Kemeny order on Xa in which the elements of S occupy the
last S ranks in any order we wish. Thus, in either case, a Kemeny order on Xa can be obtained by
splicing any order on S with a Kemeny order on Xa\S.
Proof. Consider the case where some Xa can be partitioned into {S, Xa\S} and let ra be any Kemeny order
on Xa. Take any s Î S and suppose that it does not occupy the first rank in ra. Let t be the alternative just
before s in ra. Combining the assumption on S and Lemma 2, we must have nst = nts. Hence s can be
moved up one rank without decreasing K(ra,R a). This gives us another Kemeny order. This argument may
be repeated until s reaches the first position. If we apply this argument to all elements in S in the reverse
order in which we want them, we will end up with a Kemeny order in which the elements of S will
occupy the first S ranks in the chosen order. The other case (the element of S in the last positions) is
handled in a similar way. The last affirmation follows at once.
Combining Theorems 5 and 6 yields the following corollary.
Corollary 7: Take any partition X ={ X1, ..., Xp} Î Ã(X) and a vector x* =( x1, ..., xp) where xa is a
Kemeny order on Xa under profile R restricted to Xa, a = 1,..., p. Then x* or equivalently the
corresponding r* is a Kemeny order on X.
4. An algorithm for the construction of Kemeny orders.
First, a partition X ={ X1, ..., Xp} Î Ã(X) must be constructed. This can be done with the
following two stage procedure. In the first stage, the subsets are constructed from the beginning, i.e. in
the order X1, X2, etc. In the second, they are constructed from the end, i.e. in the order Xp, Xp-1, etc. The
algorithm attempts to construct a partition as fine as possible. However, there may remain a large residual
subset when the procedure stops.
There is a non-negative and integer parameter g in this procedure to be set by the user. It controls
the fineness of the partition, including the size of the residual subset. The choice of a value for g is a
10matter of compromise. With g = 0, the partition belongs to the subclass Ã0(X) Ì Ã(X). The greater the
value of g the finer the partition. On the other hand, some Kemeny orders may escape us with too high
a value of g. This will be illustrated after the presentation of the algorithm.
First stage: Suppose X1, X2, ..., Xi-1 have been constructed.
Step i : Let X
i = X\(X1ÈX2È...ÈXi-1).
If X
i = Æ, stop the procedure. {X1, X2, ..., Xi-1} is the desired partition.
If X
i ¹Æ , let S ={ s Î X
i : sMt " t Î X
i};
I f0< S £gor if [ S > g and sMt " s Î S, " t Î X
i\S],
set Xi =Sand go to step i +1 ;
Otherwise, go to the second stage.
Second stage: Suppose X1, X2, ..., Xi have been constructed in the first stage and Xp, Xp-1, ...Xk+1 in this
second stage.
Step k : Let X
k = X\(X1ÈX2È...ÈXiÈXpÈXp-1È...ÈXk+1) and S ={ s Î X
k : tMs " t Î X
k}
I f0< S £gor if [ S > g and tMs " s Î S, " t Î X
k\S],
set Xk =Sand go to step k −1 ;
Otherwise, set Xk =X
k and stop the procedure.
{X1, X2, ..., Xi, Xk,..., Xp-1, Xp} is the desired partition.
Except for the residual Xk, the subsets of the partition constructed by the algorithm are either
singletons or cycles of T. If there are no cycles of M other than those of T, then only the first stage of the
algorithm is used and there is no residual subset. Moreover, with g = 0, we get the finest possible partition
of Ã0(X) but not necessarily of Ã(X).
Still with g = 0, if there is a unique cycle in M other than those of T, then the algorithm gives
again the finest possible partition of Ã0(X) and the residual subset Xk is made up of this cycle. If there
is more than one cycle in M other than those of T, then the residual subset contains all these cycles and
all alternatives that are between those of the different cycles according to the majority relation.
Once a partition is obtained, a Kemeny order on each subset must be found and these orders are
spliced together to yield a complete Kemeny order on X. For singletons, this is trivial. For cycles of T,
11any order will do. For this reason, it will be argued below that the members of these subsets could be
declared ex aequo. Finally, the Kemeny orders on the residual subset Xk can be found by simple
enumeration. When performing the latter, most orders are quickly eliminated because they do not satisfy
Lemma 2. Yet, the size of the residual subset may pose some difficulty, hence the need to keep it as small
as possible.
If the residual subset is made up of cycles of M (no ties), the algorithm presented here is unable
to reduce its size whatever the value of g, even if there are many disjoint cycles (with other alternatives
between them) in this subset. However, raising the value of g may help in diminishing the size of the
residual subset if some of the cycles that it contains are cycles of M but not of M, i.e. contain ties. Note
that allowing for ties may increase the frequency of cycles as well as their length. As a compensation, we
obtain this possibility of reducing the size of the residual subset even if it is made up of a single cycle
in M. This is illustrated with real examples taken from the data of Olympic Games analyzed in Truchon
(1998).
The first example comes from the men free program of the 1992 olympic games. The residual
subset Xk, with g = 0, contains 11 skaters, namely skaters ranked 4 to 14 according to their raw marks.
The reason is that there is a cycle of M on the subset {4, 5, 6, 7, 8} and another one on the subset
{12, 13, 14}, which the algorithm does not identify. However, with g = 1 the residual subset is split into
{{4}, {5, 6, 7, 8}, {9}, {10}, {11}, {12}, {13}, {14}}. This is possible, thanks to Theorem 6, since
4Mt " t Î {5, ..., 14} and tM14 " t Î {4, ..., 13}. Once 14 is removed from the original residual
subset, 13, 12, ..., 9 can be removed in turn to form singletons in a new partition. The new residual subset
{5, 6, 7, 8} cannot be broken further since there is a cycle of M on this subset.
Another example comes from the women short program of the 1988 olympic games. In the results
of this competition, there is a cycle of M over 9 skaters, namely skaters ranked 12 to 20 according to their
raw marks. With g = 0, these nine skaters make up the residual subset Xk. Applying the Kemeny rule over
a set of this size is already costly. With g = 1, the residual subset is split into {{12}, {13}, {14}, {15, ...,
20}}. This is possible because 12Mt for all other t in this subset. Once 12 is removed from this subset,
13 and 14 can be removed in turn. The new residual subset {15, ..., 20} cannot be broken further because
there is a cycle of M on this subset.
12Why not set g as high as possible, say X ? The men short program of the 1976 olympic games
provides a good illustration. The data yield 3T4T6, 5T7T8, 3Mt " t ¹ 3, 4; 4Mt " t ¹ 3, 4, 6; 5M6,
5M8, 7M6, and 8M6. Hence, there is a cycle of M on the subset {3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8} namely
4T3M5T7T8TM6 and 6T4. With g = 1, skater 6 is removed from this subset. With g > 1, this subset is
broken further into {{3, 4}, {5, 7}, {8}, {6}}. If all that is wanted is a Kemeny order over {3, 4, 5, 6,
7, 8}, then one should indeed set g = X to ease up the search of such an order. However, Kemeny
orders are not necessarily unique and we may be interested in knowing all of them. In the case at hand,
consider the subset {5, 7, 8}. There are 3 Kemeny orders on this subset namely: 5 7 8, 7 5 8, and 5 8 7.
With g > 1, this last order would never show up. Thus, if we are interested in identifying all Kemeny
orders, we should limit ourselves to g = 0 or 1. This is the choice that has been done for the computations
presented in Truchon (1998). However, there could be circumstances calling for a higher value of g.
Notice that, even with g = 1, some Kemeny orders could formally escape us but the latter are easy
to catch up. Consider the set {a, b, c, d} and suppose that it can be split into {{a}, {b, c, d}} because
aTb, aMc and aMd.I fbcd turns out to be a Kemeny order on {b, c, d}, then clearly bacd and abcd are
both Kemeny orders on {a, b, c, d}, which is easy to identify. This case of multiple Kemeny orders is
possible only if there are at least four alternatives in the subset to be partitioned. Indeed, suppose that the
3-element set {a, b, c} is split into {{a}, {b, c}} with g = 1 because we have say aTb and aMc. Then
we should also have cMb. With bMc, the splitting would rather be {{a, b}, {c}} and with bTc,n o
splitting would occur. But, with aTb, aMc, and cMb, there is a unique Kemeny order: acb.
From the above examples, we can appreciate the compromise to be made in setting the value of
g. A good strategy is to start with a low value of g, say g = 0 or 1, and then increase this value if the
residual subset is too large. Increasing this value may be necessary since finding Kemeny order by
enumeration becomes prohibitive as the number of alternatives increases. A procedure written by the
author in Mathematica gives the Kemeny orders on a set of 7 alternatives in less than 3 seconds on a
Pentium 200. Computing time goes to 26 seconds with eight alternatives and to 13 minutes with nine
alternatives. This dramatic increase in time is partly due to a lack of memory. With more alternatives,
finding a Kemeny order directly is almost out of reach. Recall that the number of possible orders on a set
of m objects is m!.
13A more efficient program could be written or a more powerful computer be used but this would
only push the problem to a higher number of alternatives. Another avenue would be to use branch and
bound techniques as in Barthelemy, Guénoche, and Hudry (1989) but these techniques also have their
limits. Hence, whatever the technique, program or computer that are used, working with partitions as fine
as possible and splicing the Kemeny orders on the subsets of this partition is almost inescapable.
We could also do better if we could distinguish all cycles rather than capture them in a single
residual subset. However, this is not an easy task. The algorithm proposed here is far more simple and
probably more efficient. In the men free program of 1992 reported above, it does a lot better than simply
identifying the two cycles. With g = 1, it breaks one of them into singletons and reduces the other one to
a shorter cycle of M. In the women short program of 1988, there is only one long cycle of M, which is
reduced to a much shorter cycle of M by the algorithm.
Actually, this algorithm has proved very efficient, with g = 1, in computing all Kemeny orders
in the 24 olympic games, yielding all the results in matters of seconds. It should be sufficient for most
practical applications involving the construction of Kemeny orders.
5. Dealing with multiple Kemeny orders.
A Kemeny order is not necessarily unique. The following rule can be applied to handle the
occurrence of multiple Kemeny orders. Given a set {r
1, ..., r
k} of Kemeny orders, consider the weak order
r
m defined by:













This weak order is a ranking according to the mean ranks of alternatives over all Kemeny orders. It will
be called the mean Kemeny ranking if it weakly agrees with at least one order in {r
1, ..., r
k}, i.e. if there

















t, this means that there are more Kemeny orders in which s is ranked ahead of t than
Kemeny orders in which s is placed after t. Thus, if a Kemeny order is chosen at random, the probability
that s be ranked ahead of t is higher than the probability that it be ranked after t.I nr
m, alternatives are






m over other Kemeny orders makes sense if r
m weakly agrees with one Kemeny order.
14However, it would be inconsistent with the Kemeny-Young approach to choose r
m if it is not a Kemeny
order, since it is then less probable than any Kemeny order. In this case, a Kemeny order could be chosen
at random or according to some other criterion.
With this approach, we look for Kemeny orders but we may end up with a weak order as a final
choice. An alternative approach would consist in working with the set of weak orders instead of orders
at the outset but this would be costly. For example, there are 75 weak orders on a set of four alternatives
compared to 24 orders. The above approach is thus more practical. In Truchon (1998), the mean Kemeny
ranking was actually chosen when it existed. Otherwise, a Kemeny order as close as possible to the official
olympic ranking was retained. The only instances where the mean Kemeny ranking failed to exist were
ones with only two Kemeny orders.
One case in which r
m gives the same rank to two alternatives s and t is when nst = nts and when
in addition s and t are adjacent in any Kemeny order. Indeed, in this case, for any Kemeny order in which
s is ahead of t, there is another one in which the only difference is that the positions of s and t are
interchanged. In particular, all alternatives of a cycle of T in a partition of Ã(X) obtain the same rank
under r
m. Consistent with this remark, all elements of each subset of the partition constructed by the
algorithm, other than the residual subset Xk, should be declared ex aequo.
There are other instances in which some alternatives could be declared ex aequo. Truchon (1998)
reports an example where three Kemeny orders are obtained on the set {A, B, C, D, E, F} namely:
EABFCD, EABDFC, and EABCDF. This means that CDF, DFC and FCD have the same likelihood. Not
surprisingly, there were a cycle C M D M F M C over the subset {C, D, F}. There is good ground here to
declare these three alternatives ex aequo since they have the same likelihood of being in any of the last
three positions. This is what happens under r
m.
6. Conclusion
An extension of the usual Condorcet Criterion to other ranks has been proposed. This Extended
Condorcet Criterion gives partial orders when there are cycles of the weak majority relation including ties
between alternatives. These partial orders may be completed by reverting to the Kemeny rule. An
algorithm to construct Kemeny orders has also been presented. The latter has proved to be very efficient
on the data of 24 olympic competitions reported in Truchon (1998). There were as many as 24 skaters in
these competitions. A total of 15 cycles of the weak majority relation, some involving 9 skaters, have been
found in these data. It was thus important to have an efficient procedure to find the Kemeny orders.
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